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MLmy West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturb-
ing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or
quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security in-
terests.1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements
that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed in
Iceland in October 1986, plus the subsequent explanations of the U.S.
administration. The Reykjavik summit also provided fresh evidence of
the Soviet Union's more imaginative diplomatic style under Gorbachev
and, more substantively, of enduring Soviet preferences regarding security
in Europe.
Although West Europeans have expressed concerns about Soviet
motives and about U.S. competence and long-term reliability, they have
reached little consensus about practical steps that governments should
take. In public declarations the West Europeans have generally professed
to be pleased with the arms-control measures discussed at Reykjavik. The
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all the allies except
France and Iceland, asserted in October 1986: "We extended our warm
appreciation to the President on his conduct of the talks and fully en-
dorsed his bold attempt to seek far-reaching arms control agreements
1. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, "Pour une expression de solidarité européenne," Le Monde,
8 November 1986, 4.
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with the Soviet Union. We fully endorsed the President's programme
presented in Iceland and stressed that this programme provides the op-
portunity for historic progress."2 Subsequent reports and Alliance
deliberations have made it clear, however, that this communiqué language
overstated West European support for the U.S. positions. According to
Robert O'Neill, the director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London, "We have got into an absurd situation, where everyone
in the alliance is saying exactly the opposite of what he thinks."3
West European misgivings concern four main topics: the tentative
agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); the proposals for
strategic force limitations, especially the U.S. plan to eliminate all ballistic
missiles in ten years; the goal of complete nuclear disarmament; and con-
flicting views on future limitations on ballistic missile defense (BMD).
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
According to a standard Western definition, there are two basic
categories of INF missiles: shorter-range INF(SRINF) with ranges between
150 and 1,000 kilometers, such as the Soviet SS- 12/22 and SS-23 and
longer-range INF (LRINF), with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500
kilometers, such as the Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 and U.S. Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles. Missiles with ranges below 150
kilometers, such as the U.S. Lance and Soviet FROG/SS-21 systems, are
not SRINF but simply short-range nuclear forces (SNF).
At Reykjavik the United States accepted a Soviet offer to endorse
a version of the global zero option for U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles
that was first proposed by the United States in 1981. The Soviet -proposed
zero option called for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles
on European soil. The Soviet Union would retain no more than 100
warheads on LRINF missile launchers in Asia, the United States no more
than the same total on U.S. soil. Despite their presummit indications,
the Soviets announced at Reykjavik that no LRINF agreement could be
firmly concluded unless the United States and the Soviet Union had also
come to terms on a package of limits on strategic forces and space and
defense systems, including new constraints on U.S. Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI) research.
Soviet spokesmen added that the Soviet Union could not return to
the pre-Reykjavik possibility of a separate LRINF agreement without
reverting to the pre-Reykjavik Soviet conditions for such an accord: no
2.Paragraph 2 of the communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, 22 October 1986.
3.Scott Sullivan, "Reykjavik Whiplash," Newsweek, 10 November 1986, 44.
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reductions in Soviet LRINF missiles in Asia, no renunciation of the de-
mand that British and French forces be counted with U.S. totals, and
no ceilings on Soviet SRINF missiles.4 At Reykjavik the Soviets agreed that
SRINF missile launchers could be frozen at current levels, with a com-
mitment to undertake negotiations on reductions. Given the large Soviet
advantage in SRINF missile launchers,5 the United States has affirmed
a right to match Soviet SRINF levels.
The December 1986 North Atlantic Council communiqué stated that
"the Allies concerned fully support the envisaged elimination of American
and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe."6 The communiqué reportedly
employed this wording because France could not support the LRINF zero
option. France is not technically one of the allies concerned because
France does not host any of the U.S. LRINF in Europe or even contribute
to the NATO infrastructure fund for their maintenance. But French of-
ficials have been most candid in expressing their concern that implemen-
tation of the zero option could result in "a situation of diminished security
for Europe."'
Although U.S. and NATO policy has called for a global zero option
in LRINF missiles since 1981, in early 1986 the Western allies agreed that
it would be preferable to settle for the lowest number of LRINF consis-
tent with the maintenance of stable deterrence. British Defense Minister
George Younger has said that, while Britain "could live with" the zero
option in LRINF missiles, his government would prefer the arrangement
discussed prior to Reykjavik— 100 LRINF missile warheads in Europe for
the United States and the Soviet Union.8
Many West European officials and experts would prefer that some
U.S. LRINF missiles be retained in Europe for deterrence purposes. As
long ago as 1983, West German state secretary for defense Lothar Ruehl
pointed out that the "optimal solution of the [LRINF] problem for arms
control" (that is, the zero option) might not be strategically desirable:
"It is imperative for the security of those countries in the Western part
of the continent, which. . .are only a few early-warning minutes away
from missiles stationed in West Russia, that an effective counter-threat
4.Valentin Falin cited in Michel Tatu. "Les ambiguïtés de l'après-Reykjavik," Le Monde
6 November 1986, 1, 3.
5.The Soviet total of 765 consists of SS-23/Scud and SS- 12/22 launchers and does not in-
clude the reload missiles for these systems or the 143 Scud launchers with Warsaw Pact allies.
The United States has no missile systems in this range category. The 72 Pershing IA launchers
are owned by the West German air force and therefore have not been involved in the U.S. -Soviet
negotiations. The Military Balance 1986-1987 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1986), 202, 205-6.
6.Paragraph 5 of the communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 12 December 1986.
7.Jean-Bernard Raimond, French foreign minister, speech in Berlin, 8 December 1986, 7.
8.Steven Erlanger, "British Defense Chief Criticizes Elements of US Arms Stance," Boston
Globe. 29 October 1986, 11.
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exerts a reliable influence on the military success and risk calculations
made by the Soviet leadership."9
This deterrence requirement was in fact the main rationale for
NATO's December 1979 decision on LRINF modernization and arms con-
trol. The decision satisfied three closely related deterrence needs: to
replace obsolescent airborne delivery systems with reliable modern systems
that could penetrate improved Soviet air defenses; to recouple U.S.
nuclear guarantees in the presence of the intercontinental force ratios
negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process;
and to deploy U.S. land-based systems in Europe of roughly the same
type as the SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union had begun to deploy in 1977.
However, in their public defense of the decision during the INF controver-
sy (1979-83), Western governments stressed only the latter purpose. As
the French foreign minister noted, this position implies that "coupling
is a political, not a military affair. On this view, the new systems are not
indispensable, and logically the 1979 double-track decision would entail
abandonment of deployment."10
But this view overlooks how a U.S. -Soviet agreement on an LRINF
missile ban in Europe could undermine the security of Western Europe.
The SS-20s and SS-4s threatening Western Europe from the western
Soviet Union would, in principle, be eliminated; but the United States
would no longer retain any missiles on European soil capable of striking
the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union would retain SRINF missiles and
other systems (including sea-based and intercontinental forces) capable
of attacking all of the militarily significant targets in Western Europe
from Warsaw Pact territory. Because of the elimination of a key part
of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, it may be argued, Western Europe
would become more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation.11 Moreover, it
would be politically difficult — if not impossible — for the United States
to return LRINF missiles to Europe if the Soviets violated the agreement
by failing to destroy the agreed numbers of missiles or by redeploying
part of the residual force of mobile SS -20s within range of Europe.
Nor are critical West European observers satisfied with the U.S.-
Soviet understanding at Reykjavik about SRINF missiles. As Karl Kaiser
9.Lothar Ruehl, "Das strategische Angebot an die Sowjetunion," Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 4 March 1983.
10.Jean-Bernard Raimond, speech at the Atlantic Conference at Saint-Paul de Vence, 7
November 1986, 7.
1 1 . General Bernard Rogers, the supreme allied commander in Europe, was widely quoted
in the West European media: "If medium-range missiles were cut to zero, and nothing were
done to reduce the Soviet superiority in shorter-range nuclear and conventional forces, then we
would be worse off than in 1979," when NATO took the decision on LRINF modernization and
arms control, owing to the growth in Soviet conventional and SRINF capabilities in the intervening
period. David Buchan, "Western military fears deal on medium-range missiles," Financial Times,
3 March 1987, 2.
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of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn pointed out,
the U.S. right to match Soviet SRINF deployments may be "purely
theoretical," since no West European government is willing to risk a repeat
of the early 1980s LRINF controversy.12 The Soviets have not even
acknowledged a U.S. right to equal SRINF deployments and have pro-
posed a freeze on current SRINF levels, pending negotiations.
Some West European analysts have noted that the Soviet Union
justified its forward deployment of new SRINF missiles in Czechoslovakia
and East Germany in 1983 with the claim that this was a response to
the initial U.S. LRINF deployments. In their view, these Soviet missiles
should therefore be subject to reduction in conjunction with any U.S.
LRINF withdrawals.13 Others have added that it would have made more
sense to link LRINF reductions to adjustments in SRINF and in the NATO-
Warsaw Pact conventional force balance. Unfortunately, however, a large
number of West Europeans probably would see any proposal to make
the LRINF zero option dependent on specific SRINF limitations as an at-
tempt to sabotage arms control and hinder the realization of the zero
option.
The agreement to negotiate SRINF reductions is also less than fully
satisfactory because the Soviets have few incentives to bargain away their
preponderant advantage in SRINF missiles. The LRINF missile removal
could therefore be followed by an indefinitely protracted negotiation,
during which the Soviet Union would retain a significant numerical
superiority in SRINF launchers (and continue to manufacture reload
missiles) while the United States might find it politically difficult to build
and deploy any comparable capabilities. The result of the negotiation
might be an agreement confirming and codifying Soviet superiority in
SRINF or a SRINF zero option, leading toward more extensive denuclear-
ization in Western Europe and increased political-military utility for Soviet
conventional force superiority.
However, when Gorbachev announced on 28 February 1987 that
the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate the LRINF zero option
"without delay" and without any linkage to the unsettled issues of strategic
offense and defense, West European governments felt they had little choice
but to endorse such an accord.14 Their rationales include a judgment
12.Karl Kaiser, "Ist eine Welt ohne Kernwaffen möglich?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
9 December 1986, 6-7.
13.Ian Cuthbertson and Joachim Krause, "Elimination of Missiles Is Unsound," The New
York Times, 14 November 1986, A35.
14.This decision was especially difficult for the French government. Minister of Defense
André Giraud and other prominent politicians of the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)
described the LRINF zero option as a "Munich." But President Mitterrand and Prime Minister
Chirac emphasized the previous Alliance commitment in principle to the zero option and the
need for policy unity in Western Europe. Jacques Amalric, "L'affaire des euromissiles divise la
majorité," Le Monde, 6 March 1987, 1, 5.
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that the 1979 two-track decision has been vindicated, a reluctance to be
seen as blocking movement in arms control, a concern that opposition
parties (such as Labour and the SPD) might benefit from any
recalcitrance, and a fear that explicit reservations about the zero option
could undermine their credibility with public opinion and revive anti-
nuclear protest movements. Many have decided that other U.S. nuclear
forces should be sufficient for deterrence and that an LRINF zero option
agreement might be made more acceptable with suitable complemen-
tary terms on SRINF and verification — though European-American
disagreements about both of the latter issues may arise.
Strategic Force Limitations
At Reykjavik, the Soviets agreed to abandon previous claims about
U.S. carrier-based aircraft and other so-called "forward-based systems"
and to accept the same definition of "strategic" as in the SALT
negotiations — systems with a range exceeding 5,500 kilometers. On this
basis the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that cuts of roughly
50 percent during a five-year period should result in equal ceilings of
1,600 strategic nuclear launch vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles
[ICBMs], submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], bombers, and air-
launched cruise missile carriers) and 6,000 warheads on launchers. (A
separate accord would cover sea-launched cruise missiles outside the
1 ,600/6,000 ceilings.) Although the two governments disagreed on many
crucial provisions of the prospective 50 percent reductions (for example,
sublimits on heavy ICBMs and the future of mobile ICBMs), West Euro-
peans were especially impressed by the disagreement regarding objec-
tives for a second five-year period. The United States proposed the
elimination of all ballistic missiles, and the Soviet Union advocated the
abolition of all nuclear weapons.
West European reservations about the U.S. proposal to eliminate
all ballistic missiles in ten years were implicit in the December 1 986 NATO
communiqués, which refrained from mentioning the proposal. The two
principal misgivings concern the overall strategic situation that might
result from implementation of the proposal and the implications for the
British and French nuclear forces, which depend heavily on ballistic
missiles.
Some U.S. officials have argued that a ban on ballistic missiles would
benefit the West because the Soviet Union has a numerical and throw-
weight advantage in every category of ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs,
LRINF, and SRINF), while the United States leads in numbers of high-
quality long-range bombers and cruise missiles. They have suggested that
ballistic missiles are particularly destabilizing because of their rapid flight
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times and their irrevocability. Many West European experts and officials,
however, have replied that deterrence of Soviet conventional aggression
in Europe could not be assured without the survivability, penetration
capability, and destructive potential of ballistic missile systems.
West Europeans have argued that the U.S. proposal is ill-founded
on several grounds: (1) Ballistic missile-launching submarines are the least
vulnerable nuclear retaliatory systems and therefore the most stabiliz-
ing. Cruise missile-launching submarines probably would be less survivable
because range limitations would force them to operate closer to the Soviet
Union. (2) Eliminating ballistic missiles would mean abandoning two legs
of the traditional U.S. strategic triad and placing heavy reliance on a
single leg— bombers and cruise missiles — that would become the prin-
cipal focus of Soviet countermeasures, offensive and defensive. (3) The
Soviets have an enormous investment and infrastructure advantage in
air defenses. (4) Soviet air defenses would be even more difficult to
penetrate if ballistic missile precursor strikes could not be used to open
attack corridors for bombers and cruise missiles and if the Soviets were
free to invest additional resources in air defenses. (5) The verification
of a ban on ballistic missiles for military attack purposes would be im-
possible when similar boosters would still be required to launch
satellites — to say nothing of the space-based elements of the U.S. SDI.
But any significant Soviet violations of such a ban could have profound
consequences for Western security. (6) The Western Alliance is intrin-
sically more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to attack by sea-launched
cruise missiles because of the coastal location of many targets the Soviets
would threaten. (7) A ban on ballistic missiles would encourage the Soviets
to invest more in bomber and cruise missile forces that are already capable
of overwhelming the inadequate air defenses of the Western Alliance.
(8) The costs of a comparable nonballistic capability to hold Soviet targets
at risk would be very high, and at any rate only ballistic missiles can at-
tack time-urgent targets. (9) Finally, as the French foreign minister asked,
"Given the nearness of the Soviet adversary, what reassurance is there
for Europe in arguments based on bomber and cruise missile flight
times?"15
The Reagan administration's attitude toward the independent
nuclear forces of Britain and France also evokes West European concern.
Immediately after Reykjavik, Secretary of State Shultz commented on
the U.S. proposal to abolish all ballistic missiles: "You would, if you agreed
to a program like this, obviously, you would then have to go to the British
and the French and the Chinese and persuade them to join you in ending
these particular kinds of weapons .... We and the Soviets aren't going
15. Raimond, speech at the Atlantic Conference, 9-10.
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to get rid of all of our ballistic missiles and leave some other countries
with them."16
This statement and similar ones by U.S. authorities irritated British
and French strategists and officials, who have long been concerned about
the risk of their forces being portrayed as the obstacle to arms-control
agreements and being somehow taken into account in a U. S. -Soviet
bargain without their participation. Raymond Barre warned, "If the Rus-
sians and the Americans agree to dismantle a large part of their ballistic
means, strong pressure will be exerted on the countries retaining such
means—notably France, which intends to keep her missiles and to mod-
ernize their nuclear warheads .... We will require great resoluteness to
keep the instrument of our independence, if the Soviet-American negotia-
tions are successful."17
Similarly, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that
Britain needed an independent nuclear force. During her November 1986
visit to Washington she persuaded President Reagan to reaffirm U.S.
plans to continue the Trident SLBM program and to support fully the
plans to modernize the British deterrent force with these missiles. Ac-
cording to Thatcher, even if the United States and the Soviet Union do
agree on 50 percent strategic force reductions, the subsequent limita-
tion of British and French forces is "not at all certain" because of the
need for "a minimal deterrent force."18
Moreover, the 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces
might have problematic implications for overall strategic stability and
West European security, depending on the specific terms and implemen-
tation of the agreement. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has sug-
gested that the 50 percent goal for the first five-year phase is so "vast"
that it should be properly verified and tested through experience "before
one can reasonably foresee supplementary steps."19 Even if the specific
terms were balanced, the risk of releasing Soviet resources for an even
larger conventional force buildup would remain.
Nuclear Disarmament
The U.S. aims for nuclear disarmament during the second five-year
period remain controversial. In the days following the summit, various
U.S. officials — including the president, the secretary of state, and the
16."Shultz: 'You've Got To Be Patient,' " The Washington Post, 15 October 1986, A24.
17."M. Raymond Barre définit les cinq conditions de' l'indépendance nationale," Le Monde,
25 November 1986, 8.
18.Thatcher cited in Michel Colomès and Marc Roche, "Thatcher joue l'Europe," Le Point,
1 December 1986, 60.
19.Jacques Chirac, speech before the Assembly of the Western European Union, 2 December
1986, text in the French Foreign Ministry's Bulletin d'Information, 4 December 1986, 6.
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White House chief of staff—made statements implying that the United
States had either proposed or agreed to the elimination of all strategic
offensive nuclear weapons or all nuclear weapons. In the written pro-
posals presented by the president at Reykjavik, however, the U.S. plan
called for the elimination of "all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of
the two sides" during the second five-year period.20 According to White
House spokesman Larry Speakes, the abolition of nuclear weapons was
discussed only as an "ultimate goal."21
The Soviets maintain, however, that the United States agreed to the
elimination of all nuclear weapons. According to Mikhail Gorbachev,
"The President did, albeit without special enthusiasm, consent to the
elimination of all — I emphasize— all, not only certain individual, strategic
offensive arms, to be destroyed precisely over 10 years, in two stages."22
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze summarized the Soviet
Union's position.
[T]he highest point in the talks was the convergence of positions of the Soviet and U.S.
leaders concerning the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We give credit to the Presi-
dent of the United States for agreeing to do this within an even shorter time span than
the one that was originally proposed in our statement of Jan. 15 [1986]."
Some U.S. officials encouraged the public impression that large-scale
nuclear disarmament was at hand by emphasizing the need to build up
Western conventional forces. Secretary of State Shultz said that, although
"deterrence based on conventional forces is sharply more expensive" than
nuclear deterrence, "it's a safer form of deterrence."24 According to
Senator Sam Nunn, Shultz "defended the concept of eliminating all
strategic offensive arms by 1996 ... he insisted that NATO could find the
will to provide a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact."25
Many West European experts and officials would disagree with the
judgment that conventional deterrence is safer and more effective than
nuclear deterrence. Since the late 1940s West European strategists have
rejected nuclear versus conventional formulations in favor of a deterrent
20."Text of U.S. Oilers in Iceland," The New York Times, 18 October 1986, 5, and Presi-
dent Reagan, Report on Reykjavik, Current Policy no. 875 (Washington, D.C. : Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State, 13 October 1986), 2.
21.Gerald M. Boyd, "U.S. Says 2 Leaders Discussed Ending All Nuclear Arms," The New
York Times, 24 October 1986, Al, A12.
22."Excerpts from Gorbachev Speech on the Reykjavik Talks and 'Star Wars,' " The New
York Times, 23 October 1986, A 12.
23."Address by Soviet Foreign Minister," The New York Times, 6 November 1986, A16.
The Soviets had proposed in January 1986 complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.
24.Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Details Reagan's Arms Bid at Iceland to Clarify U.S. Posi-
tion," The New York Times, 18 October 1986, 1, 5.
25.Sam Nunn, "The Reykjavik Summit: What Did We Really Agree To?" Congressional
Record (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 17 October 1986), S16575-77.
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posture based on both types of capabilities. Moreover, they have empha-
sized the necessity of nuclear threats for reliable deterrence. West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Thatcher, and others have warned that con-
ventional war in Europe must not be allowed to become more feasible
and probable.
The key NATO communiqués of December 1986 called attention to
Warsaw Pact conventional force superiority and the chemical threat and
declared that "nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation."26
French officials were particularly forthright in warning against "very dis-
tant, probably Utopian, [and] perhaps even dangerous" proposals that
could "weaken the foundations of today's security."27 There is, they have
added, no alternative to nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future— not
only because nuclear threats alone can deter Soviet aggression, but also
because the Western Alliance (including the United States) is unwilling
to pay "the economic and social costs of conventional rearmament to meet
Warsaw Pact superiority."28
Limitations on Ballistic Missile Defense
As suggested above, West European governments have been more
concerned about apparent U.S. -Soviet agreements at Reykjavik (par-
ticularly about INF) than about the sharpest disagreement — ballistic
missile defense. Some West European strategists even assessed the U.S.-
Soviet discord on SDI as beneficial because it prevented the formaliza-
tion of agreements that could have been harmful to Western security
interests. West European doubts about the Reagan administration's
approach to strategic defense and arms control are, however, perhaps
even more profound than their misgivings about the nuclear force policies
pursued at Reykjavik. Five main disagreements are evident: the value
attributed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; interpretations of
its constraints on research and development activities; allegations of Soviet
noncompliance; the treaty's importance for the credibility of the British
and French nuclear forces; and the prospect of a transition — cooperative
or noncooperative — to large-scale U.S. and Soviet BMD deployments.
The merits of the ABM treaty in West European eyes can scarcely
be exaggerated. Most West Europeans consider the ABM treaty a bulwark
against the destabilization of a tolerable situation of mutual vulnerability.
They view this situation of mutual vulnerability as the soundest basis for
26.Paragraph 6 of the communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 12 December 1986,
and paragraph 3 of the communiqué of the Defense Planning Committee, 5 December 1986.
27.Raimond, speech in Berlin, 16.
28.Raimond, speech at the Atlantic Conference, 8-9.
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long-term East-West political accommodation and cooperation. Without
the ABM treaty, it is feared, an offense-defense arms race would endanger
prospects for arms control and détente and increase the risks of war. West
Europeans were therefore generally gratified by the U.S. decision at
Reykjavik to accept a mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM
treaty for ten years.
Conversely, many West Europeans have been disturbed by changing
U.S. definitions of allowable research and development activities during
the ten-year period of treaty compliance. At Reykjavik the Soviets pro-
posed a definition of permitted research that the United States found
even more confining than the restrictive U.S. interpretation of the ABM
treaty. The U.S. administration did not make clear then whether it would
observe its restrictive interpretation of the treaty during that period or
whether it might at some point adopt the broader interpretation that
it regards as legally correct. U.S. officials have subsequently indicated
that if the United States were to drop the goal of eliminating all ballistic
missiles, the Soviet Union would have to accept the broader interpreta-
tion of the ABM treaty set forth by the United States in October 1985.29
This position would place the United States at odds with the declared
policies of some of its allies. Kohl, for example, said that the United States
should continue with the restrictive interpretation and that, in any case,
the United States and the Soviet Union should both conform to "an agreed
interpretation. . .until such time as a new agreement is concluded be-
tween them."30
U.S. allegations of Soviet noncompliance with the ABM treaty repre-
sent a third broad area of U.S. -West European disagreement. From a
U.S. perspective, Soviet behavior under the ABM treaty has been discour-
aging and has undermined the confidence essential to an effective arms-
control process. The United States has found the Krasnoyarsk radar to
be a clear violation of the treaty. The U.S. government has judged other
Soviet activities — the development of readily transportable BMD system
components, the testing of air defense radars and surface-to-air missile
components in an ABM mode, and the preparation of infrastructure for
national territorial defense — as potential or highly probable violations.
As the president noted, such noncompliance "increases doubts about the
reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner," especially as the Soviets
have failed to provide satisfactory explanations or to take corrective ac-
tions to alleviate U.S. concerns.31
29.Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Confirms Move to Push for Ban on Ballistic Missiles," The
New York Times, 20 November 1986, Al, A13.
30.David B. Ottaway, "Kohl Points to Soviet Superiority in Conventional Forces," The
Washington Post, 23 October 1986, A36.
31.The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 February 1985), 1,7-9.
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West European comments have usually been limited to the
Krasnoyarsk radar and to broad statements of principle. The essential
difference between the Reagan administration and the West European
governments seems to be one of degree: the West Europeans generally
display higher confidence that arms-control regimes, such as the ABM
treaty, can prevent the emergence of one-sided advantages. Therefore,
they are reluctant to take irrevocable steps in response to violations that
do not seem to them militarily significant enough to justify the aban-
donment of a treaty.
A fourth area of disagreement concerns the future of the British and
French nuclear forces. The 1986 British defense white paper repeated
London's long-standing conditions for nuclear force reductions: "If Soviet
and U.S. strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and
if no significant changes occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, we
would want to review our position and to consider how best we could
contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat."32 The
French government has outlined a more complex and precise set of con-
ditions. But, like Britain, France has recently reemphasized the central
importance of "the potential defensive systems that might in the future
be opposed to these nuclear forces."33
This condition means that traditional British and French policy is
inconsistent with the U.S. strategic concept for relating SDI to arms con-
trol. The U.S. strategic concept maintains that radical reductions in of-
fensive nuclear forces would take place in tandem with substantial
increases in U.S. and Soviet defenses against such weapons. The British
and French reject the idea that they could be expected to reduce their
offensive forces in the face of dramatically improved Soviet defenses; in-
deed, they probably would have to increase their forces to maintain the
technical credibility of their deterrent threats. The U.S. position at
Reykjavik — that the United States and the Soviet Union would require
only limited "insurance policy" BMD capabilities after the elimination
of all ballistic missiles — could not be an improvement from the British
or French viewpoint.
Nor do the fundamental transition issues show any sign of resolu-
tion. The U.S. strategic concept for a cooperative transition is one that
the Soviets may seek to exploit for their own purposes, while the concept
of a noncooperative transition provokes even greater anxieties in Western
Europe. The goal of both concepts— a U.S. -Soviet relationship of defense
dominance — does not appeal to Western Europe because of the strategic
32.Statement on the Defense Estimates 1986, Cmnd. 9673-1 (London: Her Majesty's Sta-
tionery Office, 1986), 11.
33."M. Raimond: 'Une disparition totale d'Europe des armes nucléaires américaines serait
redoutable,' " Le Monde, 17 October 1986, 4.
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implications of radically diminished Soviet vulnerability to long-range
nuclear attack.
West Europeans who have examined the concept are concerned that
other means of competition could become more prominent if technical
advances in active defenses (against air and missile forms of attack)
reduced the credibility of long-range nuclear threats. An arms-control
regime of defense dominance, even if it included active defenses in
Western Europe, would not necessarily extend to other means of nuclear
attack (such as Soviet nuclear artillery) or Soviet conventional and
chemical weapons advantages. Given that the Soviet Union probably
would continue to seek political advantage in the contiguous regions of
Eurasia, the United States and its allies would have to increase substan-
tially their local defense and deterrence capabilities to compensate for
the decreased credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees based
on long-range nuclear strike assets. Western Europe might have less securi-
ty at higher cost, some have argued. There is some concern that even
if a relationship of mutual U.S. -Soviet invulnerability to nuclear attack
did not lead to conflicts limited to third party territories, it could imply
a U.S. -Soviet condominium or an increase in West European dependence
on U.S. -Soviet relations for their security.
The U.S. proposals at Reykjavik also bewildered many West Euro-
peans because SDI seemed to be transformed from a research program
intended to determine the technological feasibility of cost-effective
defenses into a practical certainty. U.S. officials implied that SDI
deployments would take place in 1996 to defend against any Soviet
cheating or attacks by third parties after the nominal elimination of all
ballistic missiles. The U.S. willingness to bargain away its entire ballistic
missile force in favor of SDI went far beyond the rationales for SDI that
West Europeans are more disposed to support: above all, the need for
a vigorous U.S. BMD research program in view of the Soviet ballistic
missile threat and Soviet BMD activities, to say nothing of the Soviet BMD
deployments around Moscow and the Soviet development of tactical BMD
capabilities.
Interpretations of Soviet Behavior
The two principal themes of Soviet policy at Reykjavik were pro-
moting a process of denuclearization, first in Europe and later globally,
and seeking new constraints on U.S. BMD research by portraying SDI as
the principal obstacle to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons and
ultimate denuclearization. Neither of these themes surprised West Euro-
pean governments because both would advance traditional Soviet aims
regarding security in Europe. Since World War II the Soviet Union has
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sought the following situation: Eastern Europe under direct Soviet con-
trol and Western Europe militarily weak and divided, without any effec-
tive alliance joining the West European states to each other or to the
United States. The Soviet Union could then dominate the whole of Europe
with a minimum of violent coercion.
A process of denuclearization would advance these aims in various
ways. The LRINF zero option could in itself have political and strategic
effects asymmetrically damaging to the Western Alliance. If the LRINF
zero option also encouraged the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. nuclear
weapons from Western Europe, it would remove key instruments of U.S.
security guarantees to NATO. Indeed, because of its dependence on U.S.
nuclear forces, the Alliance would be deprived of much of its substantive
military content. The Soviet denuclearization proposals at Reykjavik were
consistent with Soviet proposals for nuclear-weapons-free zones in Europe
since the late 1 950s and with proposals pledging "no first use" of nuclear
weapons since 1982. All are intended (in conjunction with Soviet nuclear
counterdeterrent capabilities) to degrade the political credibility of U.S.
nuclear guarantees, thereby increasing West European vulnerability to
Soviet coercion.
A process of denuclearization also would advance Soviet interests
because it would attach a stigma of illegitimacy to the West's other nuclear
forces — those maintained by Britain and France. The Soviet interest in
building up political pressures against these countries (and, incidentally,
causing divisions among the West Europeans) has been evident for years.
The French foreign minister recently called attention to a statement made
by the Soviet foreign minister that "the reason why France and Great
Britain are so worried about the zero option and the post -Reykjavik
climate is because they want to cling to their nuclear privileges, with no
thought to the overriding interests of the rest of Europe."34 The pre-
Reykjavik Soviet proposals that the United States break its Trident missile
agreement with Britain and that the British and French agree to freeze
their forces or negotiate directly with the Soviet Union about them ap-
pear to be intended to give the Soviets a means of managing and even-
tually eliminating all nuclear obstacles to the Soviet dominance of Europe.
In other words, the priority that the Soviets attach to nuclear
disarmament measures is partly explained by their desire to make the
Warsaw Pact's conventional force superiority more useful politically. In
the context of Reykjavik and earlier Soviet proposals to reduce and other-
wise restrain Western nuclear options, the Soviet initiatives for conven-
tional arms control in an Atlantic-to-the-Urals framework appear to be
intended to advance the Soviet Union's denuclearization aims in Europe
34. Raimond, speech at the Atlantic Conference, 6.
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by neutralizing Western recognition of the Warsaw Pact's conventional
force superiority. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe historically has
been justified by the Soviet conventional preponderance. If the Soviets
could use a new arms-control forum to persuade Western publics that
the existing conventional force relationship in Europe is one of overall
parity (as they have asserted for years in their public diplomacy), they
could deprive the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe of its main political-
military rationale. The Soviets appear to favor the establishment of a
new conventional arms-control forum to promote a negotiated withdrawal
of the U.S. military presence in Europe while pursuing a droit de regard
over Western Europe's conventional defense arrangements.
The Soviet interest in perpetuating the ABM treaty's constraints on
U.S. BMD research and in establishing new limitations on related U.S.
research and development activities was obvious at Reykjavik. The Soviets
appear to be looking beyond the uncertain fate of SDI to the likelihood
that SDI-related research could spur technological advances in various
armaments. For example, confining SDI tests to the laboratory could
hinder the West's development of detection and guidance technologies
and associated applications of information processing for nonnuclear long-
range offensive and defensive systems. New limits on nuclear tests could
inhibit the development of means of hardening these new technologies
against nuclear effects. In other words, the Soviets may see the selective
slowdown of SDI-related technologies as a means to make SDI itself more
vulnerable to political and arms-control interdiction and to circumscribe
U.S. research and development in key areas of advanced technology rele-
vant to both nonnuclear and nuclear military operations.35
SDI-related technologies affect West European security interests in
both BMD and advanced military systems. Technological quality and in-
novation, along with nuclear weapons, have been the West's main means
of compensating for the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantages in conven-
tional military power. Although West Europeans have various reserva-
tions about the Reagan administration's advocacy of SDI (for example,
the vision of defense dominance making nuclear weapons impotent and
obsolete), they recognize that the United States should maintain a robust
BMD research program and be prepared to counter Soviet breakout or
creep-out from the ABM treaty's constraints. Soviet BMD programs have
origins and purposes distinct from those of the United States, and a large
unilateral Soviet advantage in BMD could pose grave problems for
Western security.
Moscow has been disappointed with the West European reservations
about the U.S. and Soviet proposals at Reykjavik. Some observers have
35. François Gorand, "Piège pour le high tech militaire," Le Figaro, 31 January- 1 February
1987, 22.
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even detected scorn and sarcasm in Soviet comments about the West Euro-
pean analyses of the Reykjavik summit. According to Shevardnadze, "The
position of some European leaders on nuclear disarmament is illogical.
Now that a real opportunity has finally emerged to rid the continent of
missiles, they have begun to talk of the need to retain U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe and to protect their own alleged privileges as nuclear
states."36 Gorbachev said, "What was being thoroughly disguised previous-
ly is now becoming more clear: among U.S. and West European ruling
circles, there are powerful forces which seek to frustrate the process of
nuclear disarmament. Some people began to assert again that nuclear
weapons are almost a boon."37
The Soviets appear to have made a formal agreement on an LRINF
zero option dependent on new restrictions on U.S. SDI-related research
at Reykjavik because they hoped to translate West European support for
an LRINF zero option into pressure on SDI. When it became clear that
this strategy would not work, the Soviets decided to follow through with
the LRINF zero option, thereby advancing several aims: to create a
climate of arms-control progress unfavorable to SDI, to remove all U.S.
missiles capable of striking Soviet soil from Europe, to provoke doubts
in Western Europe about U.S. deterrence commitments, to promote a
process of denuclearization in Western Europe, and so forth. The Soviets
have in recent years made it clear that they expect that a new phase of
détente in East-West relations would result in a general slowdown in
Western defense efforts and an increase in Western loans and technology
transfers to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets apparently judge that such
benefits would justify the elimination of the major part of the SS-20 force.
Interpretations of U.S. Behavior
West European assessments of U.S. behavior at Reykjavik vary.
Socialist and social democratic parties have condemned generally the U.S.
position on SDI as blocking "progress towards an arms control agreement
of historic proportions."38 Labour foreign-policy spokesman Denis Healey
said, "It is tragic that [SDI] wrecked the whole thing at the last minute
because President Reagan must have known this would be the central
issue before he left for Reykjavik." One of the Social Democratic party's
(SPD) spokesmen, Horst Ehmke, described the end of the summit as "a
black Sunday for humanity."39 The leader of the SPD parliamentary group
36."Address by Soviet Foreign Minister," A16.
37."Excerpts from Gorbachev Speech on the Reykjavik Talks and 'Star Wars,' " A12.
38.Neil Kinnock cited in Joseph Lelyveld, "Reykjavik Was a Shock At 10 Downing Street,"
The New York Times, 9 November 1986, E2.
39. Karen DeYoung, "NATO Allies Avoid Criticism, but Seek SDI Compromise," The
Washington Post, 14 October 1986, A20.
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in the Bundestag accused the government led by Chancellor Kohl of bear-
ing part of the responsibility for the failure of the Reykjavik summit
because of its support for SDI.40 In contrast, while apportioning most of
the blame to Reagan's SDI, Neil Kinnock and other socialist and social
democratic observers in Western Europe deplored the Soviet linkage of
SDI and the LRINF zero option from October 1986 until February 1987
as "illogical."41 Reykjavik has tended to encourage those who believe that
nuclear disarmament might be accomplished rather easily and those who
are inclined to suspect the United States of being the main obstacle to
this goal.
More centrist and conservative political observers have reproached
the United States for incompetence and hasty improvisation and, more
fundamentally, for failing to recognize the long-term dangers in radical
arms-control proposals. The charge of incompetence is rooted in several
circumstances: the way the Reykjavik summit emerged from the Daniloff
affair, the impression of insufficient preparation or Alliance consulta-
tion, the U.S. acceptance of the Soviet agenda, the U.S. decision to ac-
cept a complete LRINF zero option for Europe (despite previous decisions
in the Alliance to retain a certain number of U.S. LRINF in Europe),
the U.S. proposal to abolish all ballistic missiles, and the postsummit
uncertainty as to President Reagan's statements. The Iran-Contra affair
and developments directly related to the Reykjavik proposals have en-
couraged a post -Reykjavik image of U.S. unreliability and ineptitude.
For example, the U.S. joint chiefs of staff have determined, on the
basis of preliminary studies, that it would be "virtually impossible" to
make all the required changes in the U.S. force posture within the ten
years that the U.S. proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles would require—
deploying air defenses, increasing U.S. cruise missile forces, converting
ballistic missile-carrying submarines into cruise missile carriers, and so
forth42 — and that NATO "would be worse off militarily in relation to the
Warsaw Pact after ballistic missiles were eliminated."43 In November 1986
some U.S. officials stated, perhaps in response to domestic and allied
criticism, that the proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles in ten years
had been "deemphasized" and that the United States might retain a small
40.Hans-Jochen Vogel cited in Henri de Bresson, "L'opposition social-démocrate critique
vivement le chancelier Kohl," Le Monde, 15 October 1986, 3.
41.Joseph Lelyveld, "Kinnock Prepares for a U.S. Mission," The New York Times, 23
November 1986, 11.
42.George C. Wilson, "Crowe Confirms Joint Chiefs Not Consulted," The Washington Post,
26 November 1986, A12.
43.George C. Wilson, "Rift Seen Between Reagan, Joint Chiefs," The Washington Post,
25 November 1986, A14. The joint chiefs of staff accepted the idea of eliminating all ballistic
missiles when the president proposed it to Gorbachev in a letter in July 1986; the idea was then
regarded as a distant aspiration. At Reykjavik the U.S. delegation decided to propose a ten-year
period for this purpose. Don Oberdorfer, "At Reykjavik, Soviets Were Prepared and U.S. Im-
provised," The Washington Post, 16 February 1987, Al, A28.
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"insurance policy" ballistic missile force.44 These statements were con-
tradicted by other U.S. officials, and the United States has formally in-
troduced the zero ballistic missile proposal in Geneva.45
The charge that the United States has not recognized the dangers
in far-reaching arms-control proposals is related to concerns about the
long-term implications for Alliance policy. The essence of this vein of
criticism is that the LRINF zero option, the zero ballistic missile proposal,
and the ultimate goal of abolishing nuclear weapons all have the de facto
effect of stimulating a process in which the Western force posture is
delegitimized in public perceptions. The Soviets have the flexibility to
advance and accept Utopian proposals, thereby placing the burden of
proof on the West. These Utopian proposals contribute to a disorienting
popular impression that the problems in East-West relations stem from
weapons. The focus on weapons diverts attention from Soviet political
aims and activities — a perverse result that is self-defeating for the West.
Some West Europeans find it all the more disconcerting that the
U.S. Reykjavik proposals seem part of a pattern evident over the past
decade. Since the late 1970s antinuclear movements and slogans have
burgeoned in the United States across the political spectrum — from the
freeze and no-first-use movements to the Catholic bishops to SDI and the
LRINF zero option. To critical West European analysts there appears to
be a general trend in the United States toward nuclear disengagement — a
groping to withdraw from nuclear vulnerability, to return to the security
of the prenuclear and pre-ICBM era. Some critics hypothesize that the
United States "feels free to sacrifice fundamental European security in-
terests in order to salvage its own"46 — that is, the United States is suspected
of trying to reduce the nuclear and ballistic missile threat to the U.S.
homeland at the price of security in Europe.
Other West European experts see a more fundamental problem — a
lack of political and strategic vision in the United States. They maintain
that the Americans have failed to recognize that nuclear weapons con-
stitute one of the foundations ofWestern security. In their view, the West
has no choice but to rely on nuclear threats, given the nature of the Soviet
political challenge and Soviet conventional and chemical force advan-
tages, and the West must find the fortitude to maintain a balanced deter-
rent posture, including nuclear strike options. They reject the view,
articulated by some U.S. officials, that Western public opinion is in-
capable of accepting nuclear deterrence over the long term.47
44.Gordon, Al , A13, and David K. Shipler, "More U.S. Changes on Arms Proposed," The
New York Times, 18 November 1986, All.
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9 February 1987, A13, A17.
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Objective West European critics will admit that West European
governments and political movements have encouraged the United States
in certain policies. For example, the LRINF zero option was invented in
Europe and has been endorsed at one time or another by all the govern-
ments of the Western Alliance — even France. With the West Europeans
regularly pressing the Americans to make arms-control concessions, less
skill has been required of Soviet diplomacy. The West Europeans also
share responsibility with the Americans for the Western failure to pro-
test the Soviet SRINF buildup in recent years. As a result, Western publics
have not been informed about this aspect of the threat.
Whatever the origins of recent U.S. arms-control policies, a number
of West European governments currently see themselves as a factor of
firmness and reason in the Western Alliance. They draw comparisons
with the pre-Afghanistan Carter administration, when West Europeans
felt obliged to steady U.S. naïveté". Particularly in France, Britain, and
the Federal Republic of Germany, Reykjavik has prompted new calls for
increased West European defense cooperation and better coordination
of security policies.
Emerging Challenges
The intra-Alliance disagreements about U.S. behavior at Reykjavik
emphasize the need to relearn certain principles of arms control. Three
principles are especially relevant: (1) the goal in negotiations should be
security, not necessarily force reductions or the elimination of broad
categories of weapons, including nuclear weapons; (2) for security,
numbers of forces may be less significant than their characteristics, such
as survivability and potency in relation to opposing forces and strategic
defenses; and (3) the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces
must be recognized.
The first principle is especially pertinent to the security of Western
Europe. Some critical West European observers of Western arms-control
policy believe that it has been focused on Utopian and politically counter-
productive goals, at least since January 1977 when the United States
declared its ultimate goal to be "the elimination of all nuclear weapons
from this earth."48 SDI and the LRINF zero option are consistent with this
goal. Both have been championed publicly as if the principal threat to
Western security was the existence of nuclear weapons rather than Soviet
political aspirations.
From the perspective of critical West European strategists, the U.S.
goal of denuclearization, which has been endorsed by many in Western
48. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs ofa President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982),
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Europe, has helped the Soviet Union to promote the perceptual
delegitimization of nuclear weapons in Western societies. The previous
Western defense consensus on a reliable nuclear deterrent has been under-
mined; and, it is argued, the West's own arms-control policies have
abetted this development. As Peter Stratmann has noted, the LRINF zero
option goal illustrates "a fundamental contradiction of perspectives be-
tween the thrust and direction of East-West security talks on nuclear arms
control and the task of politically stabilizing and thus in the long term
assuring the structure of the accepted NATO strategy."49
In other words, Western security planning should recognize that
credible nuclear response options have to be maintained, as long as they
have a useful role to play in balancing Soviet capabilities and making
the West less vulnerable to Soviet blackmail or aggression. Nuclear
weapons are instruments that help to keep the risks of political and
military aggression incalculable for the Soviet Union. Rather than focusing
on these instruments of Western security, which will remain indispen-
sable for the foreseeable future, Western diplomacy should focus on the
political roots of East-West antagonism. The availability of an alternative
to nuclear deterrence through strategic defense measures or other means
has yet to be demonstrated. As a result, the West needs "a progressive
and measured approach to disarmament: to know what is possible but
also to recognize what remains out of reach for a long time to come."50
The second principle suggests that such goals as 50 percent reduc-
tions in strategic nuclear forces are not necessarily constructive. Security
and stability are more important than numerical reductions. Although
stability is probably more a product of political relations than of force
characteristics and balances, some types of reductions could be dangerous
and destabilizing. The 50 percent reductions under negotiation by the
United States and the Soviet Union could produce a more dangerous situa-
tion if the specific reductions were not carefully formulated because at-
tacks against a large portion of the remaining U.S. forces could become
a more practical and attractive proposition than in the current situa-
tion. Since Reykjavik the Soviets have made explicit their intention to
retain ICBM throw-weight and prompt counterforce superiority. U.S. in-
feriority in this respect is unlikely to be altered by equal or proportionate
cuts in force levels. As Alexander Haig said in 1979, "When you have
imbalances that exist and you recreate them at lower levels, it makes them
49.K. -Peter Stratmann, Aspekte der Sicherheitspolitischen und Militärstrategischen Ent-
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more dangerous than at higher levels, where you have greater flexibility
and there is some synergism."51
Since what matters operationally is capability relative to an oppo-
nent, strategically balanced negotiations would focus on damage-limiting
capabilities as well as offensive strike forces. The Soviet Union's exten-
sive damage-limiting investments include passive means of force sur-
vivability (mobility, deception, hardening, redundancy) and active
defenses (especially air defenses) that have never been subject to negotiated
constraints. The inclusion of strategic defenses in arms-control negotia-
tions would be beneficial because it would oblige Western policymakers
to devote greater attention to East-West asymmetries and to the implica-
tions for stability and security of specific accords.
The third principle— the need to recognize the relationship between
conventional and nuclear forces — has been implicit since the origins of
the Western Alliance, and Western governments have reaffirmed it since
Reykjavik. But the Western Alliance appears to lack an agreed frame
of reference for relating its nuclear arms-control goals to conventional
arms control and conventional force development planning. Soviet con-
ventional force superiority in Europe has been one of the fundamental
challenges to Western security from the outset.
This conventional force superiority places the Soviet Union in a strong
negotiating position with respect to both nuclear and conventional arms
control in Europe. The Soviet Union derives "maneuverability" for nuclear
arms control through its steadily enhanced conventional force advan-
tages.52 At the same time, of course, the Soviet Union generally declines
to acknowledge that it enjoys geographical and numerical advantages
in conventional military deployments in Europe. Logically, the Western
Alliance should make reductions in its nuclear forces dependent on reduc-
tions in Soviet capabilities for conducting conventional offensives in
Europe. Strategic and theater nuclear forces are linked to conventional
forces in NATO's military strategy of "flexible response," and Western
arms-control policy should recognize this linkage.53
With these three principles, it is clear that the West needs to under-
take a comprehensive analysis of its security requirements and the possi-
ble contributions of arms control. The analysis should be more explicit
and complete than has been evident in the past. The result should be
51 . Alexander Haig, The Sail II Treaty, hearings, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
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a package including strategic defenses and conventional forces that would
be far more comprehensive than the current Soviet proposals. Such a
package is desirable, if only to guide the Western Alliance in framing
and evaluating specific and more limited agreements. Such an analysis
could help to make it clear why a zero option for LRINF in Europe is
strategically unwise, even if it seems appealing on near-term public
diplomacy grounds.
